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FOREWORD
In October 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a
roundtable on democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Particular
attention was paid to the role the U.S. military and Department of
Defense played in democracy support. This study developed from a paper
presented at the roundtable.
Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz reject the notion that the political
culture of African states allows or even encourages military
intervention in politics. Drawing on case studies from Nigeria and
South Africa, they contend that if the fragile democracies in SubSaharan Africa are to be sustained, African militaries must be
extricated from politics and take decisive steps toward the type of
military professionalism seen in stable democracies around the world.
U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are so limited that
the region will receive only a very small proportion of the human,
political, military, and economic resources devoted to American
national security strategy. This makes efficiency imperative. Dr.
Butts and Dr. Metz argue that if U.S. strategic resources are used
wisely in Africa, they can have the desired effect. In particular, the
U.S. military can play an important part in helping African militaries
professionalize. They close with concrete proposals through which the
U.S. Department of Defense and the Army could more effectively support
African democratization.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study as
a contribution to the ongoing debate over how the Army could better
promote U.S. national interests by helping to prevent conflicts rather
than simply responding once violence has broken out.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Introduction. To the surprise of many observers, Africa has
experienced a recent wave of democratic transitions and popular
movements in support of open government. But this trend is far from
irreversible. In particular, African civil-military relations must be
reformed. The United States should play a major role in this. To do
so, American planners and policymakers must have a clear,
historically-grounded understanding of the dominant patterns of
African civil-military relations.
Nigeria. Few African nations have more potential than Nigeria,
but few have experienced greater trauma in attempts to build
democracy. Nigeria's strategic and symbolic importance make it a
bellwether for democratization in the rest of Africa.
The Nigerian military has ruled the country for most of its
independence. Beginning in 1985, the government of Major General
Babangida began a controlled transition to civilian democracy.
Although elections in June 1994 were considered the freest in Nigerian
history, Babangida annulled the results and prevented M.K.O. Abiola,
the apparent victor, from assuming office. In November 1994, General
Sani Abacha abolished an interim government and built what is often
considered the most repressive and corrupt regime in Nigeria's
history. Despite opposition from a democracy movement and
international pressure, Abacha appears entrenched while Nigeria
experiences economic collapse and teeters on the brink of ethnic war.
During the decades of military rule, the Nigerian armed forces
have lost nearly all semblance of professionalism and become
thoroughly corrupted. Senior officers all become immensely rich
through theft, while junior officers and enlisted men live in poverty.
Today, there are no civil-military relations in the normal sense of
the phrase. The military is incapable of self-reform and cannot lead
democratization. Only a radical transformation of the military and the
wholesale replacement of the officer corps could open the way to
democracy. Unfortunately, there is no force capable of doing this, and
the Nigerian political economy, in which political office is seen
primarily as a gateway to wealth, mitigate against sustainable
democracy.
South Africa. South Africa shows that African armed forces can
serve as the midwife of political change rather than its opponent.
During the transition from an apartheid to majority-rule system, the
South African Defence Force (SADF) supported the government and
promoted internal stability. It was thus one of the keys to the
success of the transition.
The current South African military enjoys a good relationship
with society and accepts civilian control. Five interrelated problems
could erode or challenge the health of civil-military relations:
• Escalating internal violence;
• Difficulties integrating the armed forces;
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• The military's budget crunch;
• The possibility of a radical successor to Mandela;
• Prosecution of former military officials for apartheid-era
activities.
With firm leadership and careful attention to civil-military
relations, South Africa can avoid or work through these problems and
thus consolidate democracy.
Recommendations. Sustaining democracy in Africa is possible, but
will be extraordinarily difficult. U.S. actions may not be decisive,
but can be important. Nigeria and South Africa suggest three tenets
that should guide U.S. efforts:
First, approach democracy support in a strategic fashion. Because
the political, military, and economic resources the United States is
willing to devote to Africa will remain very limited, American polices
and programs must be synchronized into a coherent strategy. To do
this, the United States should:
• Develop a strategy of democracy support for each African state.
This should be led by the State Department, but the Department of
Defense and the U.S. military can provide vital links to African
militaries and should spearhead efforts to reform African civilmilitary relations. To do this, the military must provide high-quality
personnel for Africa assignments. Rejuvenation of the Army's foreign
area officer (FAO) program would be an important contribution.
• Take a long-term perspective focusing on consolidating
democracy rather than simply instigating it. Special support should be
provided at the end of the "honeymoon" period for a new democratic
government and during the follow-on election.
• Help create an African Democracy Council composed of senior
government and nongovernment supporters of African democracy to
coordinate actions. This would serve as a forum for communication on
democratization, and as a mechanism to support democracy movements in
other states. Its liaison in the United States should be the National
Endowment for Democracy.
• Adopt a policy of zero tolerance for coups against elected
governments and actively support international efforts to politically
and economically quarantine coup-makers. Because of Nigeria's symbolic
importance, U.S. pressure should escalate and include an oil boycott.
Second, concentrate on perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes.
Because the United States will not smother Africa in aid, U.S. efforts
should concentrate on cultivating the appropriate perceptions,
beliefs, and attitudes for sustaining democracy. One of the most
important of these is civilian control of the military. To encourage
this, the United States should:

vi

• Seek the greatest possible expansion in the International
Military Education and Training program.
• Lead an effort to form a Pan-African Staff College. This should
be located in a democratic African state and be staffed with a faculty
from democracies in Africa, the Americas, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific
region.
Third, emphasize military reorganization and the development of
regional security mechanisms. To facilitate healthy civil-military
relations and improve military-society ties, the United States should:
• Encourage African states to move toward a system that combines
a small standing army with a somewhat larger reserve force.
• Encourage the formation of a NATO-like mutual security pact
composed of African democracies. By facilitating military downsizing,
aiding officer professionalization, and serving as a mechanism for
quarantining coup-makers, this organization could play an important
political and symbolic role in building a community of African
democracies.
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ARMIES AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW AFRICA:
LESSONS FROM NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
Introduction.
Even when they are more caricature than accurate portrayal, the
popular myths, images, and traditions associated with political
leaders say much about the prospects of a country. In the United
States, the dominant image is probably that of a politician on the
stump, shaking hands, kissing babies, and making promises meant to be
taken with a grain of salt. While not a particularly appealing
portrait, it at least suggests that every American politician has a
deep obligation to the public. By constrast, the dominant political
image in Africa is often that of the "big man" or "president for
life," whisked by sunglassed bodyguards into a Mercedes limousine with
darkened windows, on his way to join the waiting brothers, cousins,
friends, and cronies he has appointed to government posts. At best,
leaders play the part of a benevolent and enlightened father, caring
for "their" people. At worst, they are psychotic dictators mistaking
fear for respect and power for support. Nearly always, though, wisdom
and power are the personal property of leaders, hopefully to be
exercised in a benign fashion but in reality often used for repression
or self-aggrandizement.
If images, myths, and traditions are windows on the truth,
Africa's would not seem to bode well for democracy. Luckily, though,
they suggest the future but do not determine it. As recent events in
Africa show, history's psychological fetters can be transcended.
Beginning in the late 1980s, the tide of democracy that earlier swept
Latin America, parts of the Asia-Pacific region, and much of the
former Soviet bloc reached Africa. By 1991, it "was a veritable tidal
wave, methodically transforming the political map of the continent."1
Autocratic governments were replaced by democracies in Zambia, Cape
Verde, São Tome and Principe, Benin, Madagascar, Lesotho, and Burundi.2
(See Map 1.) Overall, more than 30 countries had pro-democracy
uprisings, many leading to substantial reforms if not outright
democratization.3 For advocates of democracy, a "new Africa" seemed to
be emerging, providing fresh opportunities in a region long darkened
by violence, repression, corruption, weak leadership, and inept
governance.
Given the changes in the strategic landscape that accompanied the
end of the Cold War, many Americans sought to make democracy support
the conceptual centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy and national
security strategy.4 The Clinton administration has at least partially
embraced this notion.5 According to the President, "working with the
new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed
to free markets and respect for human rights is a key part of our
national security strategy."6 This will be more difficult in Africa
than in any other part of the world. Democracy there is far from
irreversible, the problems faced by newly elected governments,
immense. Without assistance, the trend toward open government can
easily become a temporary interregnum from dictatorship.7 Even while
"democracy is finding its root in country after country," Anthony Lake
notes, "many African nations are but one step away from crisis."8
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For African democracy to succeed, civil-military relations must
be reformed. Armies have long been a major obstacle to democracy in
Africa, seizing power with depressing frequency and often dominating
the political process even under civilian regimes. This tendency still
lingers in spots.9 But little by little, step by step, African
militaries are turning from enemies to promoters of democracy. The
importance of this cannot be overestimated. African militaries are and
will remain crucial political actors. "The question is not," according
to William Gutteridge, "whether armies will participate in politics
but to what extent and by what means."10 Their role in the promotion
and sustainment of Africa's fragile democracies is thus pivotal:
Africa's militaries are vital allies for any individual, state, or
organization supporting open government.
To play a role in African political reform, the United States
must hone its understanding of the forces promoting and opposing
democracy. While the ability of Americans to encourage, shape, and
influence the reform of African civil-military relations will be
limited, with focused, well-thought-out policies and programs
organized into a coherent strategy, the United States can play an
important role. By examining both successful and failed democratic
transitions and the role the military played in them, American
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planners and policymakers can frame policies that reflect a clear,
historically-grounded understanding of African civil-military
relations and thus slightly increase the chances that open government
will be sustained.
Nigeria: The Augean Stable.
To grasp the role that African militaries should play in
democratization, it is first necessary to examine how they have
thwarted it. For this, Nigeria provides a perfect case study and a
virtual museum of pathological civil-military relations. This is a
tragedy of immense proportions. Few African nations have more promise
than Nigeria. It is the most populous nation in Sub-Saharan Africa by
far, extensive oil reserves give it a rare level of economic
potential, its military is one of the largest and most proficient on
the continent, and it is extraordinarily rich in human capital. And,
unlike some other states that have economic or military power without
the will to use them, Nigeria considers itself a model for Sub-Saharan
Africa and a spokesman for the Third World in general. It has, for
instance, participated in many U.N. peace operations including those
in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia, Angola, Rwanda,
Mozambique, Namibia, and Zaire.11 More recently, Nigeria formed and led
a major peacekeeping effort in Liberia and provided military advice
and training to other African states such as Gambia and Sierra Leone.12
When a Liberian peace agreement was arranged in 1995, George Obiozor,
director-general of Nigeria's official foreign policy think tank,
said, "By brokering a successful peace among the warring factions of
Liberia, Nigeria has reconfirmed her primacy in the West African subregion in particular and Africa in general."13 Nigeria currently holds
one of the rotating positions on the United Nations Security Council
and actively seeks a permanent seat.14 Strategic and symbolic
importance thus make Nigeria a bellwether for the rest of Africa.
Unfortunately, much of this potential and the immense energy of
the Nigerian people has been wasted through misgovernment. Since
independence, Nigeria has undertaken several attempts to build
democracy, but all have been thwarted by military intervention. The
army has directly ruled the country for 25 of its 35 years of
independence, and exerted a powerful influence over policymaking even
during the brief periods of civilian government. There have been seven
successful military coups and many failed ones.15 Throughout Africa,
statist economic policies, weak political institutions, and what
Samuel Decalo refers to as "an internally fractured army composed of
personal loyalty pyramids," have led to military coups.16 Nigeria
symbolizes and epitomizes the pathology of civil-military relations in
Africa.
Nigeria is an artificial state created according to colonial
exigencies rather than ethnic coherence. It has three main groups: the
largely Christian Ibo in the southeastern part of the country, the
Yoruba in the southwest, and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the north.
Together, these three constitute 65 percent of the Nigerian
population, with the remainder belonging to a number of minority
groups. During the colonial period the British used "indirect rule,"
leaving local political structures intact, particularly in the Muslim
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north.17 This, along with a policy of deliberately emphasizing ethnic
differences to facilitate colonial control, inhibited the emergence of
a national identity. Ethnic competition and, often, conflict, has thus
been the preeminent political problem for Nigeria during its entire
existence. The military has often used ethnic differences to justify
intervention in politics and painted itself as the only force that can
hold the nation's fractious tendencies in check.18
The modern Nigerian military took shape during the Biafran War of
1967-70 as the army grew from a light infantry force of about 6,000 to
one of over 250,000 equipped with heavy weapons and supported by air
and naval power. The war also saw a sharp erosion in the military's
trust of civilian leadership. Despite training in the British notion
of military professionalism that stressed civilian control of the
military, the Nigerian army seized power in January 1966.19 This began
a dismal tradition of military intervention in politics. In 1975
General Yakubu Gowon, who had ruled Nigeria since late 1966, was
overthrown by reformist senior officers and a new regime headed by
Brigadier Murta Muhammed began a managed transition to democracy.20 He
purged the military and civilian bureaucracy of many inefficient or
corrupt officials and instigated a five-stage program for restoring
civilian, democratic government. The first steps were creation of new
states to better distribute political power among the ethnic groups
and the writing of a new constitution (modeled after the American).21
The culmination was the transfer of power to an elected government in
1979. Although Muhammed was assassinated during a failed coup in
February 1976, his successor, General Olusegun Obsanjo, completed the
transition.
Despite (or because of) the opportunities provided by the oil
wealth flowing into Nigeria during the Second Republic, the civilian
government proved massively corrupt and ineffective. Much of the oil
money was squandered on useless projects or stolen by corrupt
officials, their patrons, cronies, and families.22 When the military
again seized power on December 31, 1983, there was celebration
throughout the country.23 Major General Muhammadu Buhari, the new head
of state, launched a "war against indiscipline" which met with initial
approval, but its repressiveness soon eroded the regime's popularity.24
On August 27, 1985, Buhari was overthrown by army chief of staff Major
General Ibrahim Babangida. According to Habibu Idris Shuaibu, a
Nigerian officer who had backed Babangida, the driving force behind
the coup was not the public's discontent or desire for democracy, but
Buhari's failure to appoint junior and middle ranking officers to
political office.25
Babangida instigated a second managed transition to democracy
designed to avoid the problems that plagued the earlier transition.
All previous Nigerian political leaders were considered tainted and
banned from involvement. And, exhibiting no lack of hubris, the
military regime sought to craft nothing less than a new Nigerian
political culture devoid of corruption and ethnic conflict.26 In
practical terms, Babangida's greatest innovation may have been the
creation of a mandatory two-party system.27 Throughout Africa, the
serious shortcomings of both one-party and multi-party systems were
evident. Having one slightly-left-of-center and one slightly-right-of-
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center party was seen as a palliative (and was a direct emulation of
the American political system). Babangida attempted for the first time
in Nigerian history to disperse real political power to local
governments and deliberately encourage political mobilization through
education and political awareness activities. And, recognizing the key
role that the competence and effectiveness of civilian officials
played in democratization, the military government created a Centre
for Democratic Studies to help train local elected officials.
Mismanagement of the economy and endemic corruption during the
Second Republic had led to economic crisis and a precipitous decline
in living standards. By the time the military seized power in 1983,
Nigeria had amassed an external debt equal to gross domestic product,
and suffered widespread unemployment, underutilizied industrial
capacity, high inflation, substantial budget deficits, and a declining
currency exchange rate.28 Babangida attempted to ameliorate this
through an economic emergency involving pay cuts and a reduction of
government subsidies, currency devaluation, privatization,
deregulation, and acceptance of an economic adjustment program
designed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.29
Unfortunately, these badly needed steps complicated democratization as
the hardships imposed on the Nigerian public eroded support for the
government. Corruption quickly returned and even escalated. Dr. Pius
Okigbe, a Nigerian economist, estimates that $12.2 billion of the
$12.4 billion in oil revenues the nation received during the Gulf
crisis were stolen.30 By the end of the 1980s, Nigeria had fallen from
a middle income country with a per capita income of around $1000 per
year to one of the world's poorest, with an estimated per capita
income of $250.31
Babangida recognized that Nigerian democracy would be
unsustainable without serious reform of civil-military relations and
professionalization of the officer corps.32 He quickly found that this
was easier said than done. After nearly 20 years of involvement in
politics, all memory of British-instilled military professionalism had
faded. Nigeria faced no serious external or internal security threat
to provide the incentive for professionalization. And Babangida's use
of officers as political administrators gave them a taste of
corruption's rewards. By the early 1990s, then, it was no longer
possible to classify officers as "political" or "professional" since
only a tiny minority remained outside the patronage system.33
Throughout Babangida's rule, military morale and self-image
declined precipitously. An organizational pattern emerged in which
corrupt senior "military godfathers" built and used networks of lower
ranking clients.34 Junior officers without a patron were unhappy with
the system, but this was often due less to commitment to the national
interest than personal jealousy and resentment of their exclusion. For
enlisted personnel, conditions were dire. While most senior leaders
were multimillionaires living in mansions and driving Mercedes, lower
ranks were victimized by Nigeria's economic collapse and lived in
crushing poverty.35 The handful of officers who did seem committed to
democratization and the broader national interest were coopted or
eliminated.36 A failed coup in 1990 signalled the cancerous condition
of the military and sparked suspicion, fear, and purges.37 Growing
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ethnic conflict also heightened schisms within the military. While the
majority of army officers were southern or middle-belt Christians, the
military had long been dominated by northern Muslims. This was a
source of deep resentment by non-northern officers and civilian
elites. Both Muslim and Christian fundamentalism had been growing for
some time in Nigeria, largely as a response to wider social decay.38
Following Babangida's 1986 decision to seek full membership for
Nigeria in the Organization of Islamic Conferences, religious tensions
flared, particularly in the middle and northern segments of the
country. More than 5000 died in religious violence between 1990 and
1994, with 1000 killed in April 1991 alone during riots in Kaduna and
Bauchi states.39
"Probably no democratic transition," Larry Diamond writes, "has
ever been beset by such a massive gap between the elaborateness of its
engineering and the cynicism of the public's expectations."40 Events
justified this. As preparation for the final stage of the transition-election of a national president and a handover of power from the
military--approached, Babangida became increasingly "corrupt,
manipulative, unpredictable, ambitious, unreliable and uninterested in
leaving office."41 Although he initially promised to restore civilian
rule by 1990, Babangida eventually postponed the turnover four times.42
The presidential campaign between Moshood Abiola of the center-left
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Bashir Tofa of the center-right
National Republican Convention (NRC) failed to generate public
enthusiasm. Most Nigerians considered the election simply one more in
a long series of charades staged by the elite. Neither Abiola and Tofa
were known as political leaders and both were considered allies of
Babangida by some analysts.43 The general's obsessive desire to control
the political transformation and his endless manipulation of the
process further jaded Nigerians. Corruption and vote-rigging during
the presidential primaries "alienated virtually the entire
electorate."44
The system of political economy that emerged in Nigeria after the
first oil boom of the early 1970s added to the perception that the
election had little or nothing to do with empowering the public. In
it, political power and wealth were coterminous. Whoever controlled
the state controlled government contracts, particularly those dealing
with petroleum. Political influence was not only one means of
enriching one's self, family, and friends, it was the only way. This
made running for office a simple business transaction. A candidate and
his clients invested in an electoral bid with the full expectation
that they would profit a thousandfold through victory.45 In such an
environment, winning an election was the only thing that mattered;
building the nation and serving public interests were irrelevant. The
military, rather than attempting to mitigate this, became one more
clique (or cluster of cliques) with a vested interest in the system.
Put simply, officers who partook of corruption did not want to see the
system changed in a fundamental way; those outside the system did not
have the power to change it.
Still, democratization lurched onward. The election on June 12,
1993, was widely considered the freest and most honest in Nigeria's
history.46 Although voter turnout was less than 50 percent, M.K.O.
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Abiola appeared to have won a clear victory with support from across
the nation. But the transfer of power never took place. During the
period leading up to the elections, an organization called the
Association for a Better Nigeria, composed of wealthy businessmen,
politicians, and some high-ranking military officers, ran a highly
visible campaign urging Babangida to retain power.47 This group won a
court order requiring the National Electoral Commission to withhold
election results until charges of vote rigging were investigated. On
June 23, Babangida annulled the elections "to save our judiciary from
being ridiculed and politicized locally and internationally."48 The
general announced that a civilian government would be installed on
August 27 as initially planned, but that new elections would be held
with Abiola and Tofa, the original candidates, ineligible.49 Supporters
of democracy both inside and outside Nigeria immediately rejected this
plan.
There were two prevalent explanations for Babangida's annulment
of the elections.50 One was that he was pressured by the group of
senior military officers who realized that their opportunity to
accumulate wealth would diminish under a civilian government, and who
believed Abiola would punish them for past corruption and abuses of
human rights. Second was that Babangida was pressured by or responding
to the needs of the Hausa-Fulani elites both inside and outside the
military who feared that the election of Abiola--who was a Muslim, but
a Yoruba--would signal the end of northern domination of Nigeria. What
was never clear was why the general waited until after widely observed
elections took place to act. One explanation for this is simply the
arrogance and poor grasp of political reality that comes to despots.
Babangida may have so concentrated power that he had become convinced
that there were no limits on his ability to manipulate the political
system. Another is that he assumed the elections would be so blatantly
tainted that the Nigerian public would demand that the military
government retain power or that new elections be held. In any case,
the general clearly underestimated the furor that his actions would
provoke.
The annulment immediately unified the diverse democratic
coalition in Nigeria. "For the first time in Nigeria's political
history," Rotimi and Ihonvbere wrote, "pro-democracy organisations,
non-governmental organisations and individuals, cutting across
religious, gender, regional and class lines came out to insist on the
need to respect the will of the people."51 The democratic movement was
centered on an array of institutions including the press, professional
associations, university faculty and students, and the labor
movement.52 While the annulment was generally welcomed in the northern
part of Nigeria and accepted with cynical fatalism in the eastern, Ibo
regions, widespread demonstrations broke out in the southwest. Tens of
thousands protested in Lagos, and were violently suppressed by the
military.53 For Yorubas, the annulment seemed to indicate the HausaFulani would never surrender political power.54 It also suggested the
northern elite continued to see the military as a prime tool of ethnic
domination.55
The annulment also exacerbated a split in the military between
supporters and opponents of democracy. At the end of June, 30 colonels
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and brigadiers retired to protest the annulment. Harvard-educated
Colonel Abubakar Umar--a former state governor and thus a beneficiary
of the corruption and patronage system--typified the disgust when he
stated, "the Nigerian military as represented by our present
leadership has become a stumbling block to the development of the
nation's democracy."56 But few of the civilian elites, including
elected officials, voiced open support for Abiola. In part, this was
due to fear of Babangida's security apparatus, but also reflected the
extent to which civilian leaders had developed a vested interest in
the web of corruption. While conditions were abysmal for the average
Nigerian, the elite suffered little and therefore saw no need for
fundamental change. Wealth immunized them from the near-total collapse
of the educational and health systems, dramatic inflation, widespread
unemployment, disintegration of the infrastructure, and the endemic
crime--much of it drug-related--that made the life of the Nigerian
public miserable.57
Even though there was no groundswell of backing for Abiola
outside Lagos and the Yoruba regions, support for Babangida collapsed
after the annulment. Protest spread and thousands of Nigerians who
lived outside their ethnic region returned home, anticipating conflict
between Yorubas and Hausa-Fulani.58 On August 26, Babangida resigned
and turned over power to an interim government led by Ernest Shonekan,
a Harvard-educated businessman. While the democratic movement welcomed
this, the interim government was composed exclusively of Babangida's
friends and allies and indicated that it would rule by military
decree. Democracy thus seemed no closer than before. Shonekan
attempted to win public approval by freeing some political prisoners,
lifting press restrictions, and indicating a willingness to dismantle
the powerful and corrupt oil industry bureaucracy, but his attempts to
gain support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
led to a massive increase in fuel prices and sparked even more
protests.59 Even Nigerians who were thoroughly cynical about the
democratization and cared little about annulment of the elections were
directly threatened by the price increases, and quickly expressed
their opposition through street protests and strikes .
On November 17, Shonekan was fired by Defense Minister Sani
Abacha who was widely considered the dominant force in the interim
government. Abacha was a thoroughly political officer--he had been a
major participant in the 1983 and 1985 coups--and had become massively
wealthy through graft.60 One report called him "the most corrupt
individual ever to succeed in taking over a country."61 Facing
disintegrating public order, economic chaos, and the specter of ethnic
conflict or civil war, Abacha dismantled the democratic institutions
created under Babangida, abolished the national and state assemblies,
dissolved the two political parties, replaced all elected state
governors with appointees, and banned political meetings and
associations.62 There were fears that the military, having lost all
credibility as the protector of the national interest, would
disintegrate into warring factions centered around powerful senior
leaders.63 But, as a master political manipulator, Abacha recognized
the need to divide and stifle opponents. Confusion and contradiction
were his primary tools. He made a rhetorical commitment to restarting
the transition to civilian rule and lifted the media bans that
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Babangida had implemented.64 He then named a diverse cabinet with both
military and civilian members, and promised a constitutional forum and
a program of economic reforms.65 He purged a number of Babangida
loyalists in the military, including nine brigadiers.66 And even while
he banned the political parties that Babangida created, Abacha
promised to allow real parties with grassroots support to emerge after
the national constitutional conference completed its work.67
Even if Abacha was sincere about political reform--which is
highly questionable--he was quickly distracted by mounting crises.
Decades of mismanagement and corruption had set the stage; the
annulment of the June 1993 elections seemed to have been the spark
that lit the fire. Two problems were particularly pressing. One was
economic collapse. After abandoning the unpopular austerity and
adjustment program, Babangida had returned to extensive state control
of the economy. The rationale behind this was obvious. The general
needed statism in order to coopt political opponents by providing them
the opportunity for corruption, and he needed to subsidize basic goods
to forestall a popular uprising. In effect, Babangida mortgaged
Nigeria's economic future for political expediency. By the time Abacha
seized power, conditions had become so dire--100 percent inflation, a
nearly worthless currency, shortages of basic goods--that a popular
uprising appeared possible.
The second (and related) problem facing Abacha was ethnic
tension. Economic difficulties and mismanagement fueled this, as
minority tribes in the oil producing regions of the south and
southeast protested that petroleum revenues inordinately benefited the
northern political and military elite. This led to government
repression so brutal that international human rights organizations
feared genocide of groups like the Ogoni.68 Other minorities such as
the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo also expressed discontent with
government indifference to environmental degradation and the lack of
development in their regions.69 At the same time, tensions between
Muslims and non-Muslims, which had simmered throughout Nigeria's
history, seemed ready to explode. In the predominately Muslim cities
of the north, there were numerous religiously-motivated attacks and
riots and, in Lagos, leaflets were circulated calling for a jihad
against Christians.70
After a brief lull, opposition to military rule intensified. In
June 1994, on the first anniversary of the annulled elections, Abiola
declared himself president and was soon arrested and charged with
treason.71 In July and August, the labor movement, led by the National
Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers, mounted a strike in
support of Abiola that brought economic life in Lagos to a
standstill.72 The government responded with violence and, when the
strike failed to spread outside the southwest section of Nigeria, its
leaders called it off.73 General Abacha used the strike to further
consolidate personal power.74 In August, he fired the commanders of the
army and navy, reportedly because they wanted to negotiate with Abiola
to seek an end to the crisis.75 In September, Abacha issued a decree
assuming absolute power and closing most newspapers, including the
influential Guardian.76 He then eliminated all civilians from his
government.77 In December, Abacha ended a long tradition of judicial
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independence in Nigeria by suspending habeas corpus.78 Abacha formed a
constitutional conference, but few democratic activists considered it
anything other than a sham.79 The general's primary technique was to
weaken, divide, and confuse opponents by simultaneously combining
reform (or the illusion of reform) with repression. While purging all
civilians from the regime, for instance, Abacha stated, "the
commitment of this administration to full democratic rule is
unequivocal."80
By the spring of 1995 opposition to Abacha erupted in the
military. There were frequent coup rumors and 150 officers were
arrested.81 As many as 400 were detained; some may have been tortured.82
Forty purported plotters, including widely-respected former head of
state Olusegun Obasanjo--the only Nigerian military dictator to
peacefully return power to civilians--were thought to have been
sentenced to death, generating a storm of international protest.
External pressure also heightened. The governments of the United
States and Great Britain took firm stands. Jimmy Carter visited Abacha
to secure Obasanjo's release, while African leaders such as Robert
Mugabe, Yoweri Museveni, and Nelson Mandela attempted to intercede on
Obasanjo's part.83 In November, international condemnation surged as
Nigeria executed nine environmental and human rights activists,
including well-known writer Ken Saro-Wiwa.84 The Commonwealth suspended
Nigeria while the Organization of African Unity condemned the
executions.85 Earlier, TransAfrica, the African-American lobbying
organization that had formed the centerpiece of the American
antiapartheid movement, launched a campaign against Nigeria's military
regime and sought an oil boycott--its first serious protest against a
black African government.86 Support for this grew throughout 1995. As
the editors of the New York Times wrote, "That is a drastic step, but
it begins to look like the only way to slow General Abacha's ruinous
course."87 The Clinton administration initially rejected the idea of a
boycott, but by the end of 1995 Assistant Secretary of State George
Moose indicated that this was being reconsidered in the wake of the
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa.88
Even though opposition to the Abacha regime has blossomed outside
Nigeria, within the country effective repression by the regime has
stifled dissent, leaving only numbness and apathy among the public.89
According to Michael Ajasin, a former state governor and leader of the
National Democratic Coalition, "If you organize demonstrations here,
[the] government will use any of its forces to kill people. We are
tired of bloodshed."90 Abacha rarely appeared in public over concern
for his security, and his rapid shifting of government officials
heightened corruption as officeholders felt they had to steal quickly
since their tenure was short.91 Anticipating demonstrations and
violence on the second anniversary of the annulled elections, the
regime launched another crackdown.92 Whether because of this or general
political malaise, June 1995 was much less volatile than June 1994,
with a stay-at-home strike in Lagos the only major problem. Today
Abacha's strategy of deliberate confusion continues as he
simultaneously pursues the most systematic repression in Nigeria's
history while claiming to seek a return to civilian rule. In a nationwide speech in October 1995, for instance, he commuted the death
sentences of some of his political opponents, lifted the ban on some
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newspapers, and stated that he would hand over power to an elected
government in 3 years but, at the same time, refused to show leniency
for the jailed M.K.O. Abiola.93 And, despite having named Yoruba
officers to two of the top four positions in the military, ethnic
tension remains serious.94
Today, there are no civil-military relations in Nigeria in the
sense of discrete military and civilian institutions with a structured
relationship. There is no discernible difference between the corrupt,
co-opted senior military leadership and the equally corrupt and coopted civilian elite. Abacha's dictum that "during the transition
period, particular attention will be made to the orientation of the
military to inculcate the spirit of subordination to the civil
authority" is utterly ludicrous considering the general's extensive
involvement in coups and political intervention.95 While the Nigerian
military retains a warfighting capability that makes it a major
regional power, officer professionalism in the western sense of
holding politics at arm's length has totally disappeared from
Nigeria's senior ranks despite Babangida's efforts to engineer it
during his rule. While the threat of a coup from junior officers
persists, if it occurs, it will most likely be driven by the plotters'
desire for personal aggrandizement and the desire to replace old
thieves with new thieves. The military is incapable of self-reform and
cannot lead successful democratization; civil-military relations are
beyond reform. As Africanist Claude Welch phrases it, "Nothing less
than a revolution in attitudes will suffice."96 The only way that
democracy can be built and sustained is through a radical
transformation of the military to include the wholesale replacement of
the officer corps.
Alone, though, even this is not enough. Pathological civilmilitary relations in Nigeria are only a symptom of deeper
malignancies. The biggest obstacle to democratization is the system of
political economy that makes political power and wealth coterminous.
So long as government office and corruption are the major--indeed, the
only--routes to wealth, democracy will not work. Supporters of
democracy within and outside Nigeria must transform civil-military
relations, but there must be simultaneous and equally profound change
in political economy and political culture. Finding a way to do this
without provoking national fragmentation, revolution, civil war, and a
human disaster of vast proportions is an immense, perhaps impossible,
task.97
South Africa: A Dangerous Dawn.
If Nigeria suggests that African civil-military relations can
degenerate to the point that radical transformation is a prerequisite
for democratization, South Africa shows that African armed forces can
play the opposite role and midwife the birth of open government. The
South African military has long been respected as Africa's most
proficient and professional military force. Despite this, the
military's acceptance of apartheid's demise was not preordained. There
were rumors of a rift between hardliners and moderates, talk of a
possible mutiny, and even whispers of a coup led by lower-ranking
officers.98 An investigation by Richard Goldstone, an eminent South
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African jurist, uncovered an organized movement within the military
and police to discredit the ANC during the transition process.99 While
President F.W. de Klerk reacted strongly and dismissed or suspended 23
white military officers (including 6 generals), this showed the
military's potential to hinder the emergence of democratic, majority
rule.100
Yet today, the South African Defense Force (SADF), now known as
the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) is a key component of
the nation's political system and remains essential for the longevity
of the government. What accounts for this dramatic transition from a
protector of apartheid to a protector of majority rule? Part of the
explanation lies with the function of the military in the apartheid
system. The white minority government used the SADF to support the
police in maintaining internal security and performing civil works and
management functions in black townships. After former Minister of
Defense P.W. Botha became prime minister (later president) of South
Africa in 1977, the military's influence in policymaking became so
extensive that some scholars talked of the "militarization" of
politics.101 But in contrast to the military praetorianism common in the
rest of Africa, the SADF was invited to assume a major role in
national policymaking rather than imposing itself on civilian
leaders.102 In contrast to other African armed forces, the SADF never
developed a corporatist ethic that sees the military as an
organization with its own interests separate from the rest of society,
and eschewed the ethical justification of involvement in politics that
is so common in the region.103 Although the military's influence on
government policies waned during the De Klerk presidency, it remained
important.104
With the demise of apartheid and the establishment of the multiethnic Mandela government, the relationship of the SADF/SANDF to
civilian leaders changed. President Mandela appointed Joe Modise as
head of the ANC's military wing, Unkhonto we Sizwe (MK) as Minister of
Defense while naming Communist Party member Ronnie Kasrils Deputy
Minister.105 A Defense Secretariat was created, through which the
uniformed head of the Defense Force was to report to the Minister of
Defense. A relatively liberal Afrikaner, Lieutenant General (retired)
Pierre Steyn became head of the Defense Secretariat and was assigned
to work on budgetary issues and long-term policy leaving the head of
the Defense Force to concentrate on military operations, intelligence,
training, and discipline.106 While the Defense Secretary and head of the
Defense Force are technically equals, this still-developing new
bureaucracy further diluted the policymaking role of the military and
forced the heads of the Defense Force to report to the head of the
Defense Secretariat for the first time. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa,
such a fall in the military's influence over national policy, when
combined with a socio-political transformation that much of the
officer corps did not welcome, would have sparked a coup. In South
Africa, the military acceded to this remarkable transformation.
The architects of the post-apartheid South African state have
been keenly aware of the importance of retaining healthy civilmilitary relations based on civilian control of the military.
According to Article 31 of the Constitution of Republic of South
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Africa, "The Security Forces as a whole, shall be required to perform
their functions and exercise their powers in the national interest and
shall be prohibited from furthering or prejudicing party political
interest."107 A June 1995 defense white paper states: "Stable civilmilitary relations depend to a great extent on the professionalism of
the armed forces."108 To cultivate professionalism and the acceptance of
civilian rule by the military, the armed forces are developing an
educational program on the role of the military in a democracy that
will be given all members of the military.
In a broader sense, the SANDF's relationship with society has
changed very little since the transition to a new government and
reflects mutual respect. Under apartheid the military supported
apartheid mainly by destabilizing regional governments and striking
guerilla targets outside the Republic.109 Its involvement in violence
within the nation was critical, but sporadic. As a result, the SADF
was less politically tainted than the South African Police (SAP).110 The
SADF presence in the black townships was often in support of civic
action projects, thus leaving a relatively positive feeling on the
part of the people toward the SADF.111 During the election process, the
SADF was able to mitigate violence and gain respect for strength of
will, evenhandedness, and political acumen. Thus, the SANDF inherited
a positive relationship with society as a whole and is respected for
remaining above the fray of domestic politics. But today South
Africa's troubles have abated, not ended. Five interrelated problems
could erode or challenge the health of civil-military relations:
internal violence; difficulties in integrating the armed forces; the
military's budget crunch; the possibility of a radical successor to
Nelson Mandela; and, the possibility of investigations leading to the
prosecution of former military officials for apartheid-era activities.

Internal Violence. South Africa's internal security situation
remains unsettled and, in some instances, has worsened since the 1994
election. Political violence between Zulu and ANC vigilantes in
Kwazulu/Natal and the assassination of policemen are examples.
Moreover, the schisms between the various black political parties and
even segments of the African National Congress, complemented by
illegal strikes and the presence of a heavily politicized, violent,
uneducated and largely unskilled group of young black men in the urban
townships--the so-called "lost generation" that grew out of the
resistance struggle against apartheid--can spark political protest and
instability should President Mandela's social policies fail.
Currently, the police cannot provide internal security for the country
without the assistance of the SANDF. The military's reaction to an
increase in violence would be a crucial determinant of the success or
failure of open government.
The African National Congress came to power in a coalition with
the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Council of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU). All three organizations used easily
manipulated, young, urban blacks to create a system of political
violence that successfully pressured the former white regime.112 Nelson
Mandela has not fully tamed the radicals in these groups nor provided
adequate opportunities for the "lost generation." COSATU continues to
back widespread strikes that have paralyzed some of the nation's major
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industries, while the SACP and some ANC leaders, including party
Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa, have criticized government policies
along racial and ethnic lines, often suggesting that government
industrial policies benefit whites to the continued exclusion of
blacks.113
Even more disturbing is the persistence of ANC self-defense units
(SDUs), which have rejected calls by Nelson Mandela and others to
disarm. These are the military arms of local ANC political units and
constitute a major source of power for party radicals.114 Armed with
AK47s, SDUs have taken over police stations, spearheaded the violent
conflict between the ANC and Inkhata Freedom Party in Kwazulu/Natal,
and often prevented the police from increasing their influence in
urban areas where, to quote President Mandela, "Powerful syndicates. .
. are on the verge of taking over, and dictating to the masses of the
people how they should behave themselves."115 Natal, in particular, is
facing a virtual civil war between local warlords.116 Should the
government fail in its efforts to disarm the SDUs, other political
vigilante groups, and quasi-political criminal gangs, it may find that
political opposition, even from within its ANC ranks, is militarily
powerful enough to veto local government policies.
Therefore, the potential exists that the SANDF could be ordered
to fight urban warfare against local warlords. This would place
tremendous strain on the SANDF's unity. The military is fully aware of
this. According to the 1995 defense white paper, "SANDF troops are
currently employed on a widespread basis in support of the SAPS...such
employment is likely to persist for some time because of on-going
public violence and the relative shortage of police personnel.
Nevertheless, the history of South Africa and many other countries
suggests that it is inappropriate to utilise armed forces in a
policing role on a permanent or semi-permanent basis."117 The problem is
finding a way to extricate the military from this mission without
opening the floodgates of anarchy.

The Integration Process. South Africa civil-military relations
are shaped by tension among three contrasting institutional traditions
and their associated perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs. The first of
these is that of the white officer corps which has no history of
coups. Second is the ANC/PAC tradition that reflects Soviet bloc
commissar-based training.118 In this, the military was simply the armed
component of the ruling party. Overt, deliberate politicization of the
army was considered normal and appropriate. The third tradition is the
more "typical" African one of the officers from the former black
homelands such as Bophutswana. For them, direct or indirect
intervention in politics is the norm; many have engaged in successful
and failed coups. They have had little impact on the SANDF.119 According
to General Georg Miering, chief of the SANDF, the SADF tradition of
civil-military relations has dominated the SANDF so far.120 That is good
news. Although at this point there is no indication that the SANDF
intends any fundamental adjustment of its relationship with the
government, the potential must be considered in light of the
inevitable clash among the three traditions.
Under its current leadership the military is unlikely to take
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revolution to the streets or threaten the government. This may change
as the highly politicized MK cadres and members of coup-prone defense
forces of the former tribal homelands assume senior SANDF positions.
The current SANDF leaders, though, seem to have inherited the SADF's
belief in civilian control of the armed forces through "objective"
means based on military professionalism and abstention from politics.121
But as both the military and civilian elites become more
heterogeneous, the government may manipulate ethnic rivalries to
control the armed forces. In a country encompassing several large
black groups, Asians, coloreds, and white groups, each with distinct
cultural norms, the politicization of ethnic conflict will always
tempt power mongers. The old SADF was itself a complex organization.
It included black Portuguese-speaking, Bushman and Zulu battalions as
well as Afrikaner-speaking and English-speaking white units. Although
generally led by white officers, units maintained their distinct
identities and were effective, in part, because of their cultural
homogeneity and the skills inherent in those cultures. Bringing in the
inadequately trained and inexperienced MK and PAC military personnel
while simultaneously demobilizing culturally distinct units is
difficult, with the potential for mutinies or intra-group violence
always present.122
There is also a possibility that South Africa may follow the
pattern of many of its African neighbors and turn military advancement
into an ethnic spoils system, giving most leadership positions to
Xhosa officers. If so, the SANDF may become vulnerable to political
manipulation by the heavily Xhosa government or lose its legitimacy
among other black ethnic groups such as the Zulu. Domestic security
missions might then be problematic if, for example, a Xhosa-dominated
SANDF attempted to suppress ethnic violence in Kwazulu/Natal. Taking
on a politically sensitive internal mission could well forfeit the
goodwill that the society as a whole now ascribes to the SANDF.
Against this backdrop, the SANDF continues the difficult
transformation into a post-apartheid force. Integrating multiple black
political parties and ethnic groups into a largely Afrikaner-led
defense force should be a difficult process. The differences in
cultural norms on a purely personal level are profound, as are the
organizational norms that the various groups bring to the integration
process. The cultural problems associated with integration have
already been manifest, surprisingly from the ANC's own MK cadre.
Approximately 22,000 MK members were to join the SANDF; this inflated
number included thousands of young, uneducated city toughs pressed
into the service of the ANC during the run-up to the election, and who
never served in the MK when it was a military force in exile. Over
5,000 members of this group, which Mr. Mandela himself says has been
"infiltrated by people who want to destabilize this process and by
sheer criminals," have embarrassed the government by going absent
without leave twice during efforts to provide them basic training.123
Unlike the PAC cadre, which are largely given good marks for
their performance in military training, many of the MKs had an
unrealistic view of what positions they should be given and what
training they require to assume positions in the SANDF.124 White
military leaders cringed at the idea of putting rag-tag thugs and
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toughs into the SANDF with no training and for only the political
purpose of meeting integration requirements.125 If a solution that
maintains standards is not worked out and unqualified MK are allowed
to assume important positions, there could be a widespread abdication
of white military leadership and the rapid evolution of the SANDF into
a politicized, paper Army unable to execute an internal security
mission. The abject failure of the National Peacekeeping Force formed
to keep order during the 1994 election does not bode well for future
efforts.126 Conversely, if the large numbers of unsuitable MK are
dismissed, they will likely swell the ranks of the SDUs and exacerbate
urban township security problems.
Thus far the process is going fairly well. As of August 1995, the
former opposition accounted for 11 generals, 1,100 officers and
approximately 15,000 soldiers of the new SANDF, albeit with a
lessening of standards. Given the continued problems with SDUs and
continued criticism and strikes by former allies, the Mandela
government may have to choose between speeding the integration process
and dropping SANDF standards, and maintaining an efficient, tough
security force capable of arresting the political violence that shows
every evidence of continuing.127

The Military Budget Crunch. Nelson Mandela is wisely attempting
to leave in place the capitalist market economy of the former
government but recognizes that it is necessary to make good on
campaign promises and demonstrate to the majority black population
that a black government can seriously address their needs. His method
for doing so is the regional development plan (RDP), the 5-year, $11
billion effort primarily aimed at providing housing for large numbers
of black urban dwellers.128 In the absence of meaningful international
financial support, Mr. Mandela's government has been forced to fund
this plan through budget cuts. The SANDF has felt its share of the
budget ax. According to a senior military officer, defense spending
fell by half between 1989 and 1994.129 While this is logical in the
context of defused regional tensions, the funding required to maintain
equipment and acquire new weapons systems has largely evaporated.
Moreover, the politically sensitive integration of PAC and ANC
military forces into the Defense Force cost an estimated 132 million
rand (approximately $36.3 million).130 This integration is a test of the
strength of the new government. Should it be perceived as being
unnecessarily delayed or unsuccessful, the Mandela government will
lose important political credits with the left wing of the ANC and
other black African political parties. Recognizing this, Minister of
Defense Modise went to Parliament to ask for more short-term funding
to support integration and promised he would be "fighting like a lion"
to prevent further defense cuts.131
While money for integration has been forthcoming, under the
current political and economic situation the SANDF will continue to
compete with social programs for the funds necessary to maintain
operational effectiveness. Substantial economic resources are needed
to sustain the transition from an all-white led Army to a multiethnic, multi-political partied defense force. For the current fiscal
year, nearly 2 million rand were added to the military budget to
facilitate the integration process. At the same time, the government
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faces a myriad of other financial demands associated with the
construction of a post-apartheid economy and society. The SANDF finds
itself facing budget reductions at the same time that the price of
integration is mounting. The SANDF budget had been dropping at
approximately 12 percent per year since the beginning of the decade, a
trend Minister of Defense Modise considers incompatible with the
integration process.132 However, the RDP, which received 5 billion rand
of the 150 billion rand 1995-96 budget, will continue to place extreme
demands on government resources, to include the defense budget.133 At
some point, the government may have to choose between maintaining
military standards and achieving the goals of the Regional Development
Plan. The budgetary process could well hurt the military more than
internal dissent.

The Possibility of a Radical Successor to Nelson Mandela. Since
being elected, President Mandela's health has been a major concern for
those following the South African government's development. While the
septuagenarian leader has broad trans-ethnic respect, his potential
successors do not. Given the ANC's broad-based popularity and growing
strength in Kwazulu/Natal, it is likely that his successor will come
from within the party. Arguably, the two most likely candidates are
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa, ANC secretarygeneral and president of the Constitutional Assembly. Neither has the
potential to replace President Mandela as a centripetal figure of
national unity, nor unquestioned support within the ANC.
Thabo Mbeki, who focuses on international affairs and receives
good marks from foreign observers and many business leaders, is not
popular with the left-of-center elements of the ANC who are
influential in the urban areas. Cyril Ramaphosa, who lost out to Mbeki
for a key cabinet post, is former head of the powerful National Union
of Mineworkers. However, he carries the disadvantage of not being a
Xhosa in the heavily Xhosa ANC. Although both men are responsible
leaders who recognize the importance of white business interests to a
prosperous South Africa and would be likely to carry on the Mandela
concept of reconciliation, they may not have the opportunity. The
average black South African has seen little economic improvement since
Mandela has been in power. Of the 41 million South Africans, only 35
percent are "economically active," and in the economic hub of Gauteng
Province there is 40 percent unemployment.134
These figures are unlikely to improve. Because of the ANC's
policy of "liberation before education" during the struggle against
apartheid, many young urban blacks are illiterate, trained in
violence, view weapons as the only source of power and, as the MK
recruits' experience with the SANDF demonstrates, have unrealistic
expectations of what a black-run government can deliver. Given the
high black birth rate, competition from the millions of illegal aliens
seeking wealth in South Africa, and the irresponsible strike policies
of the major union, economic growth sufficient to mollify black
demands will be difficult, perhaps impossible. Further, in spite of
the availability of funding in the budget, the government-run RDP is
foundering on the shoals of inefficient government bureaucracy and
"near chaos" in regional government.135 The economic and social
realities fuel the flames of radical rhetoric and set the stage for
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the emergence of a left-of-center, charismatic and autocratic black
leader. This would place great stress on the SANDF. The political
unity of South Africa itself after Mandela is not a foregone
conclusion. Schisms within the SANDF resulting from the emergence of a
radical national leader could be the precipitant of national
fragmentation.

Prosecution of former military officials for apartheid-era
activities. The issue of amnesty for crimes committed before the
election of the current Government of National Unity is a bitter and
divisive one and has largely been avoided by the Mandela government as
it sought to unify a multi-cultural country. Blacks oppressed by the
enforcement arms of the white apartheid government view the torture
and assassination used to battle anti-apartheid organizations as
criminal and pressure the new government to root out and prosecute
guilty individuals. Whites largely viewed this period as a time of war
and organizations such as the PAC and ANC as subversive terrorist
groups, deserving of the treatment they received. Moreover, the ANC
itself is embarrassed by inquiries into the torture and murder of its
own members.
Despite this, in July 1995, President Mandela signed legislation
establishing a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" to expose human
rights abuses from the apartheid era.136 The decision to prosecute
Magnus Malan, former head of the SADF and Minister of Defense, and 10
other retired senior officers (including five generals and an admiral)
for murder--and Mandela's acceptance of the decision--sent shock waves
through the white population and much of the SANDF leadership. The 11
accused men are alleged to have sanctioned the paramilitary training
of a group from the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party who, in 1987,
massacred 13 women and children in KwaZulu-Natal.137 The decision has
polarized the various ethnic communities. In the SANDF, it pits white
SADF veterans who revere and support Malan against the recently
integrated opposition who view them as criminal oppressors. The
ultimate impact of the case is yet to be seen, but it undoubtedly
complicates the already difficult integration process and may portend
further scrutiny of the apartheid-era activities of SANDF leaders. The
issue has driven a wedge between Mandela and Deputy President F.W. de
Klerk.138 If this case is simply the first of many instigated by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the fragile peace between the
constituent parts of the SANDF could be shattered.

In contrast. Although internal violence, a difficult integration,
and a budget crunch could complicate South Africa civil-military
relations and potentially hinder the consolidation of democracy, the
contrast with Nigeria remains stark. In Nigeria, those who understand
the role of the military in stable democracies and are interested in
moving their own armed forces in that direction have largely been
purged or peripheralized. The only constituency for professionalism
within the military seems to be junior officers susceptible to
cooptation and retired officers who have already stolen their share.
Nigeria's increasing isolation from the global military community will
only exacerbate this.
In South Africa, the top military leadership--white as well as
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black--gives every sign of commitment to civilian control of the
military and healthy civil-military relations. South Africa's
reintegration into the global military, political, and economic
communities may further encourage this, thus lowering the pressure on
an already beleaguered democratic system. Rocky Williams--a SANDF
colonel and preeminent expert on South African civil-military
relations--is probably correct when he contends that the SADF's
tradition; the strength of South African civil society; the absence of
political or economic disintegration and the legitimacy of the
political system; schisms within the officer corps; and South Africa's
complexity all mitigate against praetorianism.139 But it is also true
that the military in a democracy must carefully avoid over-association
with any one element of society. The more cohesive the society, the
easier this is.140 Few democracies are more complex and violently
divided than South Africa.141 The ongoing professionalization of the MK,
PAC, and homeland components of the SANDF is a race against time,
hopefully to be completed before Nelson Mandela's unifying presence
fades from the political scene. The end of apartheid may represent a
new political dawn, but it remains a dangerous one.
Recommendations: The American Role in Democracy Support.
African democracy can be sustained but to do so will be
extraordinarily difficult. The tradition of colonialism and postcolonial misgovernment, when combined with the problems arising from
dependent economies, poverty, ethnic and religious schisms, rapid
population growth, ecological decline, statist economics, corruption
and nepotism, and ingrained patterns of violence pose tremendous
obstacles to stable, open government. As Africans attempt to surmount
these, U.S. actions will not be decisive but can be important. The
experience of Nigeria and South Africa suggest some of the vital
points and useful actions for American strategists and policymakers.
From these cases, tenets can be drawn to guide U.S. efforts. Three are
particularly important.

Approach democracy support in a strategic fashion. For the
foreseeable future, Africa will remain an area of ancillary or
peripheral concern for the United States. This means that the
resources devoted to democracy support, whether political, military,
or economic, will be limited. As a result, American policies and
programs must be intricately synchronized into a coherent strategy if
they are to have any lasting effect. The normal method of U.S.
involvement in democratization is reactive and ad hoc. By contrast, a
strategic approach focused on the ends, ways, and means necessary for
success would entail the development of clear objectives, an accurate
assessment of the resources available to attain these, and some notion
of how to synchronize and phase the application of resources in
pursuit of objectives. The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) is
an example.
The United States should tailor a strategy of democracy support
to each African country with the State Department in the lead. The
Department of Defense will always be a secondary player but can
spearhead efforts to reform civil-military relations. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs can contribute
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to the overall coherence of U.S. strategy, while American military
officers in-country can provide a link and channel of communication to
their African counterparts. Since armies dominate the military forces
of African states, the role of the U.S. Army will be particularly
important. Any U.S. country team that marginalizes its military
component will have a harder time understanding and influencing the
officer corps of the host nation than a country team that fully
integrates and utilizes its military members. The military component
of a U.S. country team can also play a vital role in developing a
strategic approach to democracy support. Through training, education,
and institutional culture, the U.S. military concentrates on long-term
and holistic strategic planning. This expertise can assist the rest of
the country team (and appropriate policymakers in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Department of State, and National Security
Council) in approaching democracy support in a strategic fashion. Of
course, it is also incumbent on the military to provide high-quality
and well-educated personnel for assignments in Africa. To be a major
player in African democracy support, the Army must rejuvenate the
foreign area officer (FAO) program by making it a more attractive
career option.
Most of U.S. effort in democratization focuses on encouraging
non-democracies to hold elections and move toward open government.
This is a vital first step, but should not represent the endpoint of
U.S. involvement. A strategic approach to democracy support would take
a more long-term perspective, with emphasis on making democracy selfsustaining rather than simply starting it. Building a sustainable
democracy is always a protracted process that unfolds in stages. The
consolidation period--making democracy "so broadly and profoundly
legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down"
in Larry Diamond's words--is particularly arduous.142
Two points are critical. One is the end of the "honeymoon" period
for the elected government. Because the people of the Third World know
that most developed nations in North America, Western Europe, and the
Asia-Pacific are democracies, they often associate economic
development with open government, assuming that democracy will bring
an immediate improvement in living standards. The political campaigns
leading to an election, with their barrage of promises, further
amplify public expectations. As a result, the people of a state often
become cynical or disillusioned once it becomes clear that their
inflated expectations will not be met. Phrased simply, people with
little experience with democracy often consider it a panacea for their
problems. When they find it is not, they can lose faith. At best,
expectations are lowered and the consolidation of democracy continues.
At worst, the new, fragile government can be challenged or even
toppled as the euphoria of the elections fades. It is particularly
important for external supporters of the democratic government to
offer political and economic support at this time and develop
realistic expectations concerning the pace of change. South Africa,
for instance, is approaching the point of widespread disillusionment.
Mandela's popularity and repeated emphasis on the long-term nature of
political and economic change might postpone the crisis until after he
leaves the political scene but, whether now or later, intensified U.S.
support may be required to consolidate South African democracy.
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The second key point in building sustainable democracy is the
follow-on election. It is standard wisdom that holding a second
election and completing a peaceful transfer of power is more difficult
than holding the first election.143 South Africa is a case in point. The
selection of Mandela's successor will be more dangerous than the 1994
election, and will serve as a vital determinant of that nation's
future. In the past, Africa has seen a number of democratizations that
eroded into dictatorship. Supporters of democracy must make it clear
that the initial election was only the first step of a difficult
journey rather than the end point of the political transformation.
This is, however, easier said than done. It is politically easy to
pressure an authoritarian government, whether military or civilian, to
hold elections. It is more difficult to pressure a government that
was, in fact, elected, but is balking at giving up power. For 50 years
the United States has shown less concern for second elections than for
those that begin the process of transformation from authoritarian to
open government. To overcome this, the focus should be on the
consolidation of democracy rather than simply its instigation.
Given the limitations of U.S. interests in Africa, a strategic
approach to democracy support should entail a form of political triage
to gain the maximum benefit from scarce political resources. Some
African states will not build and consolidate democracy for a long
time; others are already well on their way. American resources should
be concentrated on a third category: African states that have the
potential to build and consolidate democracy, but need outside help
and encouragement. In all cases, a state's commitment to democracy
should continue to be a primary criteria for any U.S. aid (other than
humanitarian assistance).
A strategic approach to democracy support would also seek to
coordinate the actions of all external supporters of democracy,
whether other African nations, European states, or the United Nations.
To assist in this, the United States should encourage the formation of
an African Democracy Council composed of senior government and nongovernment supporters of democracy in the region. This would offer a
forum for nations in the midst of democratization to exchange ideas
and seek advice, and serve as a clearinghouse for the assessment of
democratization efforts. It would also provide a mechanism to offer
support to advocates of open government and pressure its opponents in
states that have not undergone democratization. The National Endowment
for Democracy could serve as this organization's primary liaison in
the United States.
The United States should also adopt a policy of zero tolerance
for military coups that overthrow elected governments, and should
actively support international efforts to politically and economically
quarantine coup makers. Current U.S. policy toward Nigeria is a useful
step in this direction. In response to Babangida's annulment of the
1993 elections and Abacha's subsequent seizure of power, the United
States ended all government-to-government military assistance and
training, requested withdrawal of the Nigerian military attache from
Washington, DC, withdrew the U.S. security assistance officer, did not
allow a newly-named defense attache to assume his station, and

21

restricted the entry into the United States of Nigerian military
officers involved in the Abacha government and their families.144 These
steps, according to Assistant Secretary of State George Moose, "were
directed at those regarded as most responsible for Nigeria's current
political impasse, namely the Nigerian military."145 The State
Department has also worked with other nations to coordinate pressure
on the military regime.
These are positive steps but the United States should escalate
the pressure and encourage other states and international
organizations to adopt an increasingly strict and coordinated
political and economic quarantine of Nigeria. For many African
militaries, Nigeria is a test case. A concerted global program of
pressure including the oil boycott advocated by Randall Robinson of
TransAfrica would set a valuable precedent. Such actions are more
politically and economically feasible now than at any time in recent
memory. Nigeria supplies only 7.1 percent of U.S. oil imports.146
Current world petroleum prices are low and other suppliers could make
up the difference. Even if an oil boycott did result in a slight price
increase and the loss of Nigerian cooperation on counternarcotic and
peacekeeping efforts, that nation's symbolic importance across Africa
is so great that the political benefits would justify the costs. Even
though an oil boycott would be largely symbolic and difficult to
enforce, it would show that even influential states are subject to
pressure from the growing community of democratic nations, and that
the United States is actually willing to pay a price for democracy
support. By this, it might help deter future coup-makers.

Concentrate on perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes. The United
States will not be able to smother emerging African democracies in
aid. El Salvador, which received nearly $6 billion in aid during the
1980s and 1990s, will not be replicated in Africa.147 In countries that
choose to undergo the difficult transition to open government, U.S.
strategy should thus concentrate on the psychological component of
democracy support. An important part of this is effective civilian
control of the military. Stable democracies all have some form of
civilian control and oversight of the military. For the United States,
civilian control is sacrosanct and can accurately be considered the
first principle of civil-military relations.148 Other democratic states
need to take this trust as seriously.
Stable democracies use a sliding scale of appropriate military
involvement in policymaking. On issues concerning military operations,
civilians usually defer to military leaders. On military organization,
doctrine, strategy, force composition, acquisition, and budget, there
is a somewhat firmer civilian hand. On national security strategy and
foreign policy, the military usually provides advice, but is seldom
the primary decisionmaker. On non-security economic, social, and
political policy, most modern democracies accord the military a very
small role in decisionmaking if any at all. This is what Huntington
called "objective" civilian control.149 African civil-military relations
have more often been based on "subjective" control where civilians
attempt to minimize the military's propensity to intervene in politics
by promoting a convergence of interests and values.150 While it is
sometimes held that objective control is impossible in the African
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environment, Huntington was correct when he argued that subjective
control is incompatible with stable, sustained democracy. American
strategies for democracy support must thus promote objective control
of African militaries rather than subjective (even though this may be
unattainable in some instances.) This approach could help create
militaries that serve as indigenous resources for democracy support.
The key to this is cultivation of appropriate perceptions,
attitudes, and beliefs. Americans who seek to help Africans
consolidate democracy must overcome infatuation with the formal
dimension of civil-military relations. Constitutions, laws,
regulations, and organizational structures may be important, but the
crux is psychological. Specific perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs
undergird healthy civil-military relations. The military, for
instance, needs to believe that civilian leaders were selected by
legitimate means and are fair, competent, and honest. Armed forces
should see their allegiance as holistic--to the nation as a whole-rather than to specific regions, groups, or individuals, believing the
military budget is fair and their service adequately rewarded given
the overall economic situation of the nation. The military needs to be
respected, its counsel adequately considered on strategic issues, its
autonomy adequate on matters that are strictly internal to the
military, and believe that civilian leaders and society as a whole
consider soldiering an honorable profession. Finally, the military
must believe that civilian rule is almost always preferable to
military rule, and that active involvement in politics is incompatible
with military professionalism and detracts from the promotion of
national security. Similarly, civilian officials must believe that
military leaders are competent, honest, and effective, and that they
deserve autonomy or authority over certain internal issues. They
should consider adequate funding of the military important. And,
civilians too must consider soldiering an honorable profession and
believe that politicization of the military would detract from
national security and political stability even though it might bring
short-term gains to civilian leaders who manipulate it. The entire
society needs to share these beliefs, and should feel that the
military represents the nation as a whole rather than one region or
segment.
The U.S. military's prime function in democracy support is
encouraging African officers to adopt the perceptions, beliefs, and
attitudes necessary for healthy civil-military relations, primarily by
providing a good example and incentives for accepting civilian
control. One of the key tools for this is the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program, which brings African officers
to U.S. military schools where they learn about and observe the
American approach to civil-military relations. The U.S. Department of
Defense considers IMET "one of the most economical and effective uses
of DoD funds in the long-term. With few exceptions, IMET graduates
have positive experiences in the U.S., and return to their countries
with a better understanding of the proper role of a nation's military
in a democratic civil society."151 The program should be expanded as
much as possible and include education of the civilians that will
exercise oversight over the military and police forces that will allow
armed forces to diminish their involvement in internal security. More
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should also be done to coordinate IMET and similar programs run by the
British, French, and other European nations involved in Africa.
Officer education is not, however, a panacea for military
intervention. One of the major problems is that Africans attending
military schools in the United States (or Great Britain or France) can
easily conclude the "western" notion of military professionalism is
appropriate here, but inappropriate in their political environment.
One way to transcend this would be creation of a Pan-African Staff
College. This could be located in a democratic African state with a
faculty drawn from across Africa, the United States, Western Europe,
and those Latin American, Eastern European, and Asia-Pacific nations
that have undergone democratization. The objective would be to
transcend the notion that civilian control of the military and officer
professionalism are culture-specific "western" concepts, and allow
officers from new democracies to use their experience to teach others
in the midst of democratization.

Emphasize military reorganization and the development of regional
security mechanisms. The United States should encourage African states
to move toward a system of military organization that combines a very
small standing military with a somewhat larger reserve force. Outside
South Africa, there is little tradition of a major reserve component
among African militaries. It is more than coincidence that South
Africa has a reserve tradition and the SADF supported civilian control
of the military and democratization. The absence of reserve systems in
the rest of Africa is largely due to the colonial lineage of armed
forces. In colonial times, militaries were more likely to impose the
government's will on the people than to defend the nation from
external aggression. A reserve system would also facilitate military
downsizing. Admittedly, this is not a panacea for military
intervention in politics. It does not take a large force to complete a
coup d'etat, so lowering the size of standing armies would not, in
itself, prevent coups. It would, though, contribute to the
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that undergird healthy civilmilitary relations.
If African militaries are to continue their transition from tools
of repression to defenders of the nation, reorganization into reservebased systems would help cement the link between the military and the
citizens of the nation and mitigate "we-they" thinking. One of the
keys to the long history of healthy civil-military relations in the
United States has been reliance on citizen-soldiers in Reserve or
National Guard units. Building such a system would help African
militaries change their self-image and lower the costs of national
defense while still providing security against external enemies or
internal insurgents. Similarly, increased U.S. and European aid for
the development of African police forces could help ease regional
militaries out of the internal security function and improve civilmilitary relations by cultivating more positive attitudes.
The augmentation and development of regional security mechanisms
could perform a similar function. The ultimate objective should be a
NATO-like mutual security pact composed of African democracies,
possibly affiliated with the African Democracy Council. Admittedly few
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African states face the imminent prospect of foreign invasion, but
such an organization could bring a number of political and symbolic
benefits. It could, for instance, allow military downsizing and
movement toward reserve-based forces by lowering inter-state
hostility. It could also facilitate officer professionalization
through frequent exchanges, the construction of personal networks, and
combined training and exercises. Perhaps most important, it could
provide an institutional framework for quarantines against coup-makers
by providing a forum for cooperation among African democracies. If
such an organization were to take shape, the United States could offer
invaluable advice, support, and training.
* * * *
Reforming civil-military relations in Africa will not assure the
success of democracy but not doing so will guarantee the collapse of
open government. Western scholars and Africans themselves have long
held that expecting African militaries to adopt the "western" model of
civil-military relations is ethnocentric. Today, such relativism
should be abandoned. Admittedly, colonialism dealt Africa a bad hand.
Admittedly, the problems faced by current African political and
military leaders are extraordinarily complex. Still, the relativism
that dominated U.S. thinking for several decades, with its all-tooeasy acceptance of corruption, repression, and political intrigue by
African military leaders is inimical to democratization and economic
development. The "western" form of civil-military relations has
nothing to do with culture, race, or region--it is not really
"western" at all. There is, in fact, a democratic model of civilmilitary relations that transcends culture.
The decision to pursue open government in Africa must be made by
Africans and cannot be imposed by outsiders. If they do make the
decision to build and consolidate democracy, they must simultaneously
move toward the type of civil-military relations inextricably
associated with it. The United States cannot force such reform on
unwilling African militaries, but should be ready to offer as much
help as possible to those who undertake such a transformation. A
strategy of democracy support built on a foundation of clear policies
and carefully-constructed institutions can be the locomotive of such
help.
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